THE AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER
PUBLISHED

AND

REVIEW

M.'ONTHLY BY MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW OF
THE

tNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Advisory Committee:

HAM PTON L. CARSON. Chairman.
ERSKINE HAZARD DICKSON.
GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAIM,
WILLIAM STRUTHERS ELLIS,
GEORGE STUART PATTERSON,
WILLIAM DRAP9R LEWIS.
GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER,
Editors:
THO.IAS JAMES M1EAGHER. Editor-in-Chief.
GEORGE HENDERSON,
ARTHUR G. DICKSON,

WALTER C. DOUGLAS, JR.,
CYRUS D. FOSS. JR.,
THOIAS S GATES,

HORACE L. HENDERSON

DILWORTH P. HIBBERD,
WILLIAM B. LINN,
BENJA-MIN F. PERKINS.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $5.00 PER ANNUxa.

SINGLE COPIES, 50 CENTS.

Address all literary communications to the EDITORIN-CUIEF, Department of Law,
University of Pennsylvania, Sixth and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pa. ; all business communications to V. S. ELLIS. Esq., 736 Drexel Building, Philadelphia, Pa.

The cases where possesBAILMENTS AND CONDITIONAI. SALES.
sion of goods is in a real or apparent vendee and there is doubt as
to the title, may be divided into two classes: one in which the
goods have been bailed with the right in the bailee to purchase
during or at the conclusion of the term of bailment; the other is
where there has been a contract of sale and the vendor has reserved
a right of property. Where there is a bailment of goods, delivery
takes place on condition that a trust shall be duly executed if there
is a special purpose attached to the delivery, or that the goods
delivered shall be restored by the bailee according to the directions
of the bailor as soon as the purposes of the bailor shall be answered.
In a conditional sale the parties to the contract agree that the
vesting in the purchaser of the complete title to the goods sold
shall depend upon a condition, precedent or subsequent.
The conditional sale has a position between bailment and absolute
sale. As to the parties themselves the question of property is in all
these cases settled according to intention but when interests of
third persons appear, difficulties frequently arise. In the case of
bailment the right of title is in the bailor, and third parties are to
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look to him for information; parties scrutinizing goods that have
been the subject of an absolute sale, look to the vendee. The
relation of third parties toward the subject of a conditional sale is
much the same throughout all jurisdictions. No title passes to the
buyer, if there is a condition precedent, until the performance of
the condition ; and if the condition is one subsequent, then the
title passes to the vendee, which title would be divested in case the
condition is performed.
As suggested before, these sales are valid in many jurisdictions:
Barrett v. Pritchard, 2 Pick. 512, (1824) ; Herring v. H pock,
15 N. Y. 409 (1857); Cole v. Berr', 42 N. J. L. 308 (i88o);
Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663 (i886). Yet there has been
so much uncertainty as to the real owner in cases of such transfers
of goods, that conditional sales have not been favored in equity ;
and in some States statutes have been passed providing that where
possession has been delivered and property reserved in the vendor,
the sale shall be void, unless recorded, as against execution creditors of the vendee and purchasers from him without notice. In
some States where chattel mortgages are void unless recorded, such
sales have been construed to be chattel mortgages. The Pennsylvania courts have from early times, without the direction of
statute, held these sales to be invalid. This has been on account
of public policy, and applies to third persons, who have bought for
value without notice, and execution creditors. A few recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania may be noted:
Where there was an agreement to erect machinery to be paid for
in stipulated installments, with the express condition that "the
title, ownership and possession of said machinery and plant" was
not to pass until all of the said payments of money had been made,
it was held a conditional sale and not a bailment: Oft v. Sweahnan,
166 Pa. 217 (1895).
Where goods were received under an agreement by which they were to be kept a certain period, and if within
that time they were paid for the title should pass, but otherwise hire
to be paid for the use of them; they were bailed, and the property
in the goods did not change until the price was paid: Brown
Bros. &' Co. v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76 (894).
When a printing
press was erected for trial on the premises of an intending purchaser to be paid for on acceptance as satisfactory, there was no
delivery until acceptance and payment ; and the parties could,
while the press was still on trial, change the contract in good faith
to one of bailment, with an alternative conversion into a sale, and
after such change in the contract the press was not liable to seizure
under execution by the judgment creditors of the person for whom
it was erected. In the opinion delivered in this case Mr. Justice
Mitchell said: "Delivery does not consist in the mere transfer of
location or custody of property. There must be the minds of both
parties concurring in the transfer in accordance with the contract,
the intent of one to deliver and the other to receive: " Printing-Press Co. v. Jordan, 171 Pa. 474 (1895).
Some cases in Penn-
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sylvania of bailment are: .Ditman v. Cat/re/l, 125 Pa. 6o6
(1889) ; E,lwards' Apj6eal, 105 Pa. 103 (1884) ; Chrislie's ApJeal, 85 Pa. 463 (1877) ; Enzow v. Klein, 79 Pa. 4 88 (1875).
Cases of conditional sale: Peek v. Heim, 127 Pa. 500 (1889) ;
_Forrest v.A'elso, lo8 Pa. 480 (1885) ; Brunsiwick v. Hoover, 95
Pa. 5o8 (188o). Stad/felt v. Huntsman, 92 Pa 53 (1879);
Jiwtin v. Jfathiot, 14 S. & R. 214 (1826).
Two recent decisions in England of cases corresponding closely
with the cases of Szd/felt v. _Huntsman and Brunswick v. Hoover
may be noticed. There they have what are termed hire- urchase
agreements. "By the hire-purchase system, an intending purchaser of goods is put into immediate possession thereof and agrees
to pay a fixed sum by fixed periodical installments, the amount
payable for each installment is expressly declared to be nothing
more than hire-money for the use of the goods during the period
intervening between two consecutive installments, and the lender
agrees that on a certain member of installments making up the
total sum being paid, the hirer shall become the owner of the
goods. On default in the payment of any installment power is
reserved to the lender to resume possession of the goods: " Law
Afagaazie andl Review, February, 1896. In Lee v. Bttler [1893],
2 Q. B. 318, A. obtained possession of some furniture from B.
under the following agreement: She was to pay ,CI on May 6th,
and ,96 4 s. on August i, 1892, these sums to be considered as
rent, and no change in ownership to take place till the whole of the
,,697 4 s. had been paid. B. was given the power of resuming
possession of the goods in case there was default in payment, and
any sums paid by A. up to that date were irrecoverable by A. A.
paid Z, and afterwards sold the goods to C. A. claimed them
from C., but he was held not entitled, for A. was a purchaser under
section 9 of the Factors' Act, and could convey a good title to a
bonafide purchaser for value without notice.
In Ho/br v. fa/the'ws, ii Law Times Reports, 446 (1895), A.
obtained possession of a piano on condition that she was to pay
IO s. 6 d. every month in advance by way of rent. When she had
paid the full value, ,C.8 iS s.. she was to become the owner. On
failure to pay any installment, the lender could resume possession
of the instrument; there was also an express clause conferring on
A. the right of terminating the contract at any time. After having
paid some of the installments, she pledged the piano with C. In
an action by the lender against C., the Queen's Bench Division
affirmed the lower court in favor of the lender. On appeal Lord
Esher, M. R., held A. to have been a purchaser. The case was
taken to the House of Lords, and again reversed.
BURDEN OF PROOF OF INSANITY IN CRIMTNAL CASES.

In a most

ablh considered opinion by Mr. Justice HARLAN in Davis v. U. S.,
i6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353, the Supreme Court of the United States
recently took sides upon a question where eminent courts and
jurists disagree. He states the question thus : " The fact of killing
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being clearly proved, the legal presumption, based upon the common experience of mankind that every man is sane, was sufficient,
the court below in effect said to authorize a verdict of guilty,
although the jury might entertain a reasonable doubt upon the
evidence whether the accused, by reason of his mental condition,
was criminally responsible for the killing in question."
After a
careful consideration of the English cases, including the answers to
the questions of the House of Lords in Jfe.A'ghl/on's Case, io Cl.
& F. 199, and of the leading cases in the American State courts
supporting the view taken by the court below, the learned Justice
concludes, following the rule in a minority of the States, that the
instruction was erroneous.
Upon this question courts have taken three positions: (a) That
the defendant must prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt:
State v. S.pencer, 21 N. J. L. 196 (1846), tried by Chief Justice
Hornblower; State v. Pratt, i Houst. Cr. Ca. (Del.) 269 (1867);
(b) That the defendant must prove to the reasonable satisfaction of
the jury by evidence which fairly preponderates: Chief Justice
Sharswood in CoyAle v. Comm., ioo Pa. 577 ,1882) ; ComM. V.
Ed11', 7 Gray, 584 (1856) ; Comm. v. Poroi, 117 Mass. 143
(1875) ; State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 584 (1870) ; State v. Smith,
53 Mo. 267 (1873) ; Zoeffner v. State, 1O 0. St. 599 (i86o) ;
State v. Starling, 6 Jones (N. C.), 366 (1859) ; Boszell v.
ComM., 2o Gratt., 86o (1871) ; (c) The position taken by Mr.
Justice Harlan agreeing with Peole v. Ofe-Canm, 16 N. V. 57
(1857) ; Chase v. People, 40 Ill. 352 (1866) ; State v. Bai-tlett,
43 N. H. 224 (1861) ; People v. Garbtt, I7 Mich. 8 (1868) ;
Cunninham v. State, 56 Miss. 269 (1879); Dove v. State, 3
Heisk., (Tenn.), 348 (1871) ; Blake v. State, 121 Ind. 433
(188o) ; State v. Coleman, 20 S. C. 442 (1883); Guiteau's Case,
io Fed 161, (D. C.) (1882).
' 1 fter examining this able opinion one cannot avoid its conclusions. In our jurisprudence the burden of proving that the accused
is guilty of committing the crime charged is upon the commonwealth. The crime of murder by its definition involves the possession by the accused of such mental capacity as will render him
liable criminally for his acts. How then, proceeds the argument,
can the jury find the defendant "guilty as charged," if they entertain a reasonable doubt from all the evidence whether he was legally
capable of committing crime ? The presumption in favor of sanity
is rebuttable ; " but," the opinion concludes, I"to hold that such
presumption must absolutely control the jury until it is overthrown
or impaired by evidence sufficient to establish the fact of sanity
beyond all reasonable doubt, or to the reasonable satisfaction of the
jury. is in effect to require him to establish his innocence by
proving that he is not guilty of the crime charged."
The case
which set the precedent for New York, and which Mr. Justice Harlan quotes with approval, was determined when Judges Denio,
Johnson, Seldon and Comstock were members of the Court of
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Appeals, and with the present Mr. Justice Peckham of counsel for
the accused, People v. -McCann, 16 N. Y. 57. In that case, in
reversing the trial court for the same erroneous instruction given in
this case, Mr. Justice Brown said: "If there be a doubt about the
act of killing, all will concede that the prisoner is entitled to the
benefit of it; and if there be any doubt about the will, the faculty
of the prisoner to distinguish between right and wrong, why should
he be deprived of the benefit of it, when both the act and the will
are necessary to make out the crime ?"
This adherence to the fundamental presumption of innocence
characterizes the reasoning of all the courts which adopt this view.
It seems to us unanswerable. With those who look with horror
upon the increased number of acquittals in atrocious crimes where
the defence is insanity, this decision will meet with disapproval ;
but surely such a possibility, attending all systems, of justice,
"ought not to induce courts to depart from principles fundamental
in criminal law, the recognition and enforcement of which are
demanded by every consideration of humanity and justice."
INSURANCE

VITIATED

BY SUICIDE.

In a late case of Ritter,

Ex. v. Ts. Co., the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
decided an important and novel point in insurance law. The
question arose upon a suit by the executor of a suicide to recover on
a policy of insurance upon the latter's life. The jury found that the
man was sane at the time of the commission of the deed, and the
insurance company defended the action on the ground that,
although the policy contained no provision against the insured
taking his own life, as a matter of law there could be no recovery
by the estate; that deliberate suicide by one who is sane vitiates
the policy. The decision of the court sustained the contention of
the defendant. It proceeds upon the general principles underlying
contractual obligations, and in substance makes it a tacit condition
of every contract of insurance that the insured, while sane, will not
take his own life. Such an event is esteemed not to be in the
minds of the parties at the time of the formation of the contract,
and the resort to it by the insured to put a premature termination
to his liability to pay premiums, and to precipitate the payment of
the amount of the policy, constitutes a fraud upon the other party
to the contract and relieves him from his obligation. The event
upon which the contract is based is death, and this is certain to
occur at some time: so the only contingency upon which the
liability of the insurer depends is the time of its occurrence. To
allow the insured to deprive him of the benefit of this contingency
would rob the contract of mutuality.
This interpretation of the contract seems to exclude all evidence
to show that it was actually intended by the parties that the insurer
should assume the protection of the insured against any present or
future disposition to suicide; and yet it is possible, that in some
cases such an intention might have been in the minds of tht parties

